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For a number of years, the author and his colleagues (see acknowledgments)
have been building, testing, and refining a diagrammatic environment intended
to support secondary school children’s learning of critical inquiry skills in the
context of science (Suthers et al 1997). During this time, a refocus on
collaborative learning led to a major change in how we viewed the role of the
interface representations. Rather than being a medium of communication or a
formal record of the argumentation process, we came to view the
representations as resources for conversation (Roschelle 1994).
These observations, coupled with the fact that other projects with similar
goals were using radically different representational systems, led the author to
propose a more systematic study of the ways in which these different
representational systems can influence collaborative learning discourse. The
differences in representational notations that are provided by existing software
for critical inquiry are striking. The range includes hypertext/hypermedia
systems (Guzdial, et al. 1997, O’Neill & Gomez 1994, Scardamalia et al. 1992),
argument mapping environments (Ranney et al. 1995, Smolensky et al 1987,
Suthers et al 1997), containment representations (Bell 1997), and matrices
(Puntambekar et al. 1997). Yet there is a lack of systematic studies comparing
the effects of external representations on collaborative learning discourse. Given
that these representations define the fundamental character of software intended
to guide learning, a systematic comparison is overdue.
Substantial research has been conducted concerning the role of external
representations in individual problem solving, generally showing that the kind
of representations used to depict a problem may influence problem solving
efficiency (Kotovsky & Simon 1990, Larkin & Simon 1987, Zhang 1997). One
might ask whether this research is sufficient to predict the effects of
representations in collaborative learning. A line of work undertaken in
collaborative learning contexts is needed because the interaction of the cognitive
processes of several agents is different than the reasoning of a single agent
(Perkins 1993), so may be affected by external representations in different ways.
Shared external representations can be used to coordinate distributed work, and
will serve this function different ways according to their representational biases.
Also, the mere presence of representations in a shared context with
collaborating agents may change each individual’s cognitive processes. One
person can ignore discrepancies between thought and external representations,
but an individual working in a group must constantly refer back to the shared
external representation while coordinating activities with others.
2 Hypothesized Effects of Representational Bias
Representational tools are artifacts (such as software) with which users
construct, examine, and manipulate external representations of their knowledge.
A representational tool is an implementation of a representational notation that
provides a set of primitive elements out of which representations can be
constructed. Developers choose a representational notation and instantiate it as a
representational tool, while the user of the tool constructs particular
representational artifacts in the tool. The present analysis focuses on
interactions between learners and other learners, specifically verbal and gestural
interactions termed collaborative learning discourse.
Each given representational notation manifests a particular representational
bias, expressing certain aspects of one’s knowledge better than others do
(Utgoff 1986). Representational bias manifests in two major ways: Constraints:
limits on logical expressiveness; and Salience: how the representation facilitates
processing of certain knowledge units, possibly at the expense of others.
Representational tools mediate collaborative learning discourse by providing
learners with the means to articulate emerging knowledge in a persistent
medium, inspectable by all participants, where the knowledge then becomes part
of the shared context. Representational bias constrains the knowledge that can
be expressed in the shared context, and makes some of that knowledge more
salient and hence a likely topic of discussion.
Stenning and Oberlander (1995) distinguish constraints inherent in the logical
properties of a representational notation from constraints arising from the
architecture of the agent using the representational notation. This corresponds
roughly to the present author’s distinction between “constraints” and “salience.”
Constraints arise from logical limits on the information that can be expressed in
the representational notation, while salience arises from how easily the agent
recovers the information (via perception) from the representational artifacts.
Information that is recoverable from a representation is salient to the extent to
which it is recoverable by automatic perceptual processing rather than through a
controlled sequence of perceptual operators (Zhang 1997).
2.1 Notations have Ontological Bias
The first hypothesis claims that important guidance for collaborative learning
discourse comes from ways in which a representational notation limits what can
be represented (Reader unpublished, Stenning & Oberlander 1995). A
representational notation provides a set of primitive elements out of which
representational artifacts are constructed. These primitive elements constitute an
“ontology” of categories and structures for organizing the task domain. Learners
will see their task in part as one of making acceptable representational artifacts
out of these primitives. Thus, they will search for possible new instances of the
primitive elements, and hence (according to this hypothesis) will be biased to
think about the task domain in terms of the underlying ontology.
2.2 Salient Knowledge Units are Elaborated
This hypothesis states that learners will be more likely to attend to, and hence
elaborate on, the knowledge units that are perceptually salient in their shared
representational workspace than those that are either not salient or for which a
representational proxy has not been created. The visual presence of the
knowledge unit in the shared representational context serves as a reminder of its
existence and any work that may need to be done with it. Also, it is easier to
refer to a knowledge unit that has a visual manifestation, so learners will find it
easier to express their subsequent thoughts about this unit than about those that
require complex verbal descriptions (Clark & Brennan 1991). These claims
apply to any visually shared representations. However, to the extent that two
representational notations differ in kinds of knowledge units they make salient,
these functions of reminding and ease of reference will encourage elaboration
on different kinds of knowledge units.
2.3 Salience of Missing Units Guides Search
Some representational notations provide structures for organizing knowledge
units, in addition to primitives for construction of individual knowledge units.
Unfilled “fields” in these organizing structures, if perceptually salient, can make
missing knowledge units as salient as those that are present. If the
representational notation provides structures with predetermined fields that need
to be filled with knowledge units, the present hypothesis predicts that learners
will try to fill these fields.
3 Empirical Studies
The author has begun studies that test the effects of representational notations
on collaborative discourse and learning. Subjects are presented with a “science
challenge problem” in a web-browser. A science challenge problem presents a
phenomenon to be explained, along with indices to relevant resources. These are
relatively ill-structured problems: at any given point many possible knowledge
units may reasonably be considered. One side of the computer screen contains
the representational tool, such as Threaded Discussion, Containment, Graph, or
Matrix. The other side contains a web browser open to the entry page for the
science challenge materials. Students seated in front of the monitor are asked to
read the problem statement in the web browser. They are then be asked to
identify hypotheses that provide candidate explanations of the phenomenon
posed, and evaluate these hypotheses on the basis of laboratory studies and field
reports obtained through the hypertext interface. They are asked to use the
representational tool to record the information they find and how it bears on the
problem. Analysis is based on transcripts of subjects’ spoken discourse,
gestures, and modifications to the interface; as well as measures of learning
outcomes. A pilot study was conducted comparing MS Word (unstructured
text), MS Excel (tables), and Belvedere (graphs), with two pairs of subjects run
in each condition. The data is currently under analysis. Preliminary results are
encouraging, and will be presented at the conference.
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